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ANNEXURE.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA.
Draft Conclusions of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, January 19, 1927, at 5 P.M.
Present:
The Right Hon. STANLEY BALDWIN, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, K.G. M.P.. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The
Right Hon. Sir LAMING WORTHINGTON-EVANS, Bt., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War. General Sir GEORGE F. MILNE, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O.. Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Colonies.
Sir W. G. TYRRELL, G.C.M.G..K.C.V.O., C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Marshal
Vice-Admiral Sir FREDERICK L. FIELD,
of the Royal Air Force Sir HUGH TRENCHARD, G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.
Sir M. P. A. HANKEY, G.C.B., Secretary to the Cabinet.
1. The meeting had been summoned to consider a Report prepared at the request of the Cabinet by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, on the subject of the defence of Shameen (C.I.D). Paper No. 762-B). Two questions of urgency, however, were dealt with before the above Report.
The Negotiations with the Cantonese Government,
2. Referring to Sir Miles Lampson's telegram No, 115* of the 19th January, in which our Minister at Peking states that, pending consideration of his telegramı No. 113,* which had crossed instructions sent to him on the 17th January, he was holding up Mr. O'Malley's negotiations with Eugene Chen at Hankow for forty-eight hours, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that he proposed to reply to the effect that it is essential to our policy that, before Eugene Chen is allowed to break off negotiations, he should know our policy and what he is refusing. He also meant to make clear that we regard Hankow only as an incident in the negotiations, and that, if he chooses to continue them, we are prepared to offer generous terms. Both Sir Miles Lampson and Mr. O'Malley would be told to treat Hankow as an incident in the larger policy.
The Defence of Shanghai: Reinforcements.
3. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff handed round a note he had received of a conversation with the Japanese Military Attaché, the purport of which was that the Japanese General Staff's original proposal had been meant to refer only to reinforcements such as could be provided by the Navy for maintaining order at Shanghai; that, in their view, the British Chiefs of Staff had exaggerated the iniminence of danger to Shanghai; that conversations in regard to military reinforce- ments on any serious scale would be premature; and that for the moment it was sufficient to exchange information.
The effect of this information on the dispositions approved by the Cabinet for reinforcing Shanghai was then discussed at some length. On the one hand was repre- sented the risk that, if orders were issued to units, whether in this country or in India, the whole of the steps we were prepared to take (alone if the Japanese refused to co-operate) in order to protect our interests at Shanghai, would become public property, and the Japanese might shy off and refuse that co-operation which the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff Committee so earnestly desired. On the other hand,
*Not printed.
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owing to the time required for reinforcements to reach Shanghai from India or the Mediterranean or from home, delay was dangerous. In this connection attention was drawn to the telegram from the naval Commander-in-Chief of the 12th January,* in which he recommended (with the approval of the Consul-General at Shanghai) the immediate despatch of a Division.
After careful consideration, it was agreed-
(a.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should definitely clear up the situation with the Japanese Government by sending the telegram attached in Appendix 1, explaining the considerations of time and space which (more especially in the absence of knowledge as to the intentions of the Japanese Government) compel the British Government to take decisions before matters appear urgent to the Japanese Government, and pressing for a reply within forty-eight hours regarding Japanese intentions. (b.) That no action should be taken to delay the provision of the necessary shipping transport for the scheme of reinforcements approved by the Cabinet, but that the issue of final orders to units and of notices to Class A Reservists should be withheld for a further 48 hours.
(c.) That the Secretary of State for War (in the absence of the Secretary of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India) should arrange with the India Office to invite the Government of India to order the units of their mixed Brigade to prepare to sail as soon as possible on receipt of further orders, and to notify that a further telegram would be sent later in the week. (d) That in regard to publicity, the Secretary of State for War should instruct the official concerned to do his best to damp down publication in the Press of military movements; to point out to the Press that such military dispo- sitions as have been taken have as their sole object the protection of British lives in China; to remind them that all military information published will reach Eugene Chen and may prejudice the negotiations now in progress with a view to a settlement,
(Sir William Tyrrell left the meeting to send the telegram referred to in (a).)
The Defence of Shameen.
4. The Meeting had before them a Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the Defence of Shameen (C.I.D. Paper No. 762-B) prepared in accordance with a decision of the Cabinet (Cabinet 2 (27), Conclusion 2 (1)). A first draft had been circulated at midday, and a revised draft, in which the alterations were indicated (Appendix II),† was handed round at the outset of the meeting.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported that he had sent the directions desired by the Chiefs of Staff (Conclusion 4, page 4, C.I.D. Paper No. 762-B) relating to the Aerodrome at Hong Kong the day before (January 18th, 1927).
After discussion it was agreed-
(a.) To approve the Report of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (C.I.D. Paper
No. 762-B). (b.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph instruc- tions, based on the conclusions of the Report, to the Acting Consul- General, Canton, which should be repeated to the Governor of Hong Kong, (c.) That the Secretary of State for War should authorise the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to send a supplementary telegram to the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong, based on the reference in the last part of paragraph 7 of the Report to the fact that we cannot expect to hold out indefinitely against serious attack by the Cantonese troops. (2.) That the Secretary of State for the Colonies should notify the Governor of Hong Kong that the instructions to Canton would be repeated and to communicate their contents to the naval and military authorities.
* Printed as Appendix to C.I,D. Paper No. 761-B.
↑ Not reproduced, as already circulated in C.I.D. Paper No. 762–R.
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